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Abstract
Two of Donella Meadows’ ‘leverage points’ for intervening in systems (1999) seem partic-
ularly pertinent to design for sustainable behaviour, in the sense that designers may have
the scope to implement them in (re-)designing everyday products and services. The ‘rules
of the system’￿interpreted here to refer to a￿ordances and constraints￿and the structure
of information ￿ows both o￿er a range of opportunities for design interventions to in￿uence
behaviour change, and in this paper, some of the implications and possibilities are discussed
with reference to parallel concepts from within design, HCI and relevant areas of psychology.
1 Meadows’ Leverage Points
In common with many areas of interaction design, design for sustainable behaviour (e.g. Wever
et al, 2008; Lilley, 2009; Lidman and Renstr￿m, 2011; Zachrisson and Boks, 2012) may bene￿t
from the application of a ‘systems’ perspective to understand better the potentially complex
interplay between technology and human behaviour.
One systems perspective which might be relevant is Donella Meadows’ concept of ‘leverage
points’, intended to be generally applicable to complex, non-linear systems, though originally
developed in the context of systems modelling for world trade negotiations. As presented in the
paper ‘Leverage Points: Places to intervene in a system’ (Meadows, 1999) and the posthumously
published Thinking in Systems (Meadows, 2009), these are a list of ‘places to intervene in a
system’, ranked in tentative increasing order of e￿ectiveness:
places to intervene in a system
(in increasing order of e￿ectiveness)
Adapted from Meadows (1999)
12. Constants, parameters, numbers (such as subsidies, taxes, standards)
11. The sizes of bu￿ers and other stabilising stocks, relative to their ￿ows
110. The structure of material stocks and ￿ows (such as transport networks, popula-
tion age structures)
9. The lengths of delays, relative to the rate of system change
8. The strength of negative feedback loops, relative to the impacts they are trying
to correct against
7. The gain around driving positive feedback loops
6. The structure of information ￿ows (who does and does not have access to what
kinds of information)
5. The rules of the system (such as incentives, punishments, constraints)
4. The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organise system structure
3. The goals of the system
2. The mindset or paradigm out of which the system￿its goals, structure, rules,
delays, parameters￿arises
1. The power to transcend paradigms
Humans are part of the system just as much as technology and political structures. Hence
there is no single leverage point dealing with ‘human behaviour’￿human decisions, abilities
and reactions can be inherent to each of the leverage points, and designers (if they have the
opportunity) could address any of the leverage points. However, it is apparent that many (not
all) designed interventions which speci￿cally aim to in￿uence user behaviour are concentrated
on leverage points 6, 5 and 4: these are the aspects which designers are especially well-placed to
tackle through changes to the design of everyday products, services and environments:
￿ 6: The structure of information ￿ows is easily addressable through design: it mainly
comprises di￿erent kinds of feedback and presentations of antecedent information.
￿ 5: The rules of the system can perhaps best be framed from a design perspective as being
about designing in actual a￿ordances and constraints on behaviour (and perhaps also rules
for ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’).
￿ 4: The power to add, change, evolve, or self-organise system structure could be seen in
design terms as being related to adaptive systems, i.e. systems which can perhaps adapt
the information ￿ows and a￿ordances or constraints present, based on users’ behaviour
and the performance or context of the system’s use. 1
The ‘design for sustainable behaviour’ use of these leverage points is often, in practice, a com-
bination of one or more of them￿e.g., depending on the context, rewards or punishments could
be seen as a kind of feedback, and indeed for a user to be aware of the a￿ordances, constraints
and rules that exist, there must be an information ￿ow going on. Thus these categories are
not a mutually exclusive de￿nition of possible strategies for intervention, but a way of fram-
ing some possible leverage points. Table 1 breaks down these three leverage points into some
possible tentative sub-categories pertinent to design for sustainable behaviour. The author has
previously employed these categories as a way of assessing the diversity of concepts generated
by participants in workshops using the Design with Intent toolkit (Lockton et al 2010a, 2010b).
1There are parallels here with elements of models proposed by Wever et al (2008) and Lilley et al (2006).
2Table 1: Some possible sub-categories of leverage points 6, 5 and 4
leverage point possible sub-categories examples
6 Information ￿ows




6.2 ￿This car can achieve up to
60 mpg if you drive it
carefully, so please do so￿
Simple feedback 6.3 ￿You have achieved 48 mpg
today￿
Comparative feedback 6.4 ￿You have achieved 48 mpg
today, which is better than
the average of 32 mpg￿
Feedforward 6.5 ￿If you drive more carefully,
you should be able to






5.1 The car a￿ords economical
use if driven carefully
Perceived user-level
a￿ordances & constraints
5.2 The driver believes that the
car a￿ords economical use if
driven carefully
Built-in system structure &
limits
5.3 There is an upper limit on
the mpg the car can return
even if driven carefully
Incentives & rewards 5.4 Saving fuel will save the
driver money
Punishments 5.5 Wasting fuel will cost the
driver more money
4 Adaptive systems Adaptive variants of all the above, where possible
This paper aims to explore some of the implications for designers of, in particular, points 5
and 6￿a￿ordances and constraints, and information ￿ows￿in the context of in￿uencing more
sustainable user behaviour. Subcategories 5.4 and 5.5, dealing with incentives, rewards and
punishments, will not be considered in this paper.
2 The rules of the system: a￿ordances and constraints
This section will explore aspects of how behaviour can be in￿uenced through the design of
the ‘rules of the system’￿a￿ordances and constraints, the latter also via related ideas such as
forcing functions and poka-yoke. Employing a￿ordances and constraints in design is really about
deliberately making things easier or harder.
While the focus here is on extracting implications applicable to in￿uencing more sustainable
behaviour, the ideas are applicable across many ￿elds relating to understanding and in￿uencing
behaviour.
2.1 Classifying a￿ordances
￿The a￿ordances of the environment are what it o￿ers the animal, what it provides
or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to a￿ord is found in the dictionary, but
3the noun a￿ordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to
both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies
the complementarity of the animal and the environment.￿
James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception , 1979, p.127 of 1985
edition
A￿ordances are a fundamental concept in interaction design, popularised in a design context
primarily by the impact of Norman’s (1988) The Psychology of Everyday Things (later repub-
lished as The Design of Everyday Things ). As evinced by the above quote, the concept draws
on Gibson’s (1979) work in ecological psychology and perception; it has a ‘life’ outside of design.
In Norman’s 1988 de￿nition (p.9), a￿ordances are ￿the perceived and actual properties of the
thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly
be used￿, but much of the book concentrates on a￿ordances as being something like ’the function
or capability that is perceived by the user’, focusing primarily on users’ perceptions of the a￿or-
dances available to them, and how to improve product and interface usability by understanding
this aspect of design.
As many have noted (e.g. Flach, 1995; McGrenere & Ho, 2000), Norman’s treatment of
a￿ordances, or at least the way the concept was adopted by HCI and interaction design, diverges
somewhat from Gibson’s original concept, which was that a￿ordances existed whether or not they
were perceived correctly by an animal in its environment￿as Za￿ (1995, p.240) puts it, ￿[t]he
individual’s continued existence may depend on an ability to detect the available a￿ordances,
but the existence of those a￿ordances cannot be said to depend on their felicitous detection￿. In
Gibsonian terms, ￿a hard, ￿at, narrow surface may a￿ord walking for me but not for a rhinoceros,
and a horizontal surface at the height of my knees may a￿ord sitting for me, but not for a small
child￿ (Warren, 1995, p.211).
2.1.1 Perception
Norman (1999) recognises the di￿erence and suggests that what matters in design is really per-
ceived a￿ordance￿whether a user perceives and understands, correctly, what actions are possible
or not. A ubiquitous example of the power of (perceived) a￿ordances is the use of handles or
plates on doors to signal whether they should be pulled or pushed; the frequent passing frustra-
tions of visitors to unfamiliar buildings on ￿nding that their intuitions are incorrect, and a door
whose handle appears to say ￿pull me￿ actually requires the handle to be pushed, demonstrate
how deeply rooted and in￿uential a￿ordances can be in shaping our everyday behaviour. Krip-
pendor￿ (2006, p.112) suggests that perceived a￿ordances are ￿the meanings of artefacts in use...
a unit of perceptual ￿t￿. Some users will perceive di￿erent a￿ordances to others￿inventive or
apparently spontaneous perceptions of opportunities for new behaviours in their environment￿
powerfully illustrated by Fulton Suri and ideo (2005) and Brandes and Erlho￿ (2006) who have
compiled collections of images of objects being used in ways their designers would not have
expected.
Gaver (1991) o￿ers a useful 2 ￿ 2 matrix (Figure 1) separating the existence of a￿ordances
from the information available about them, leading to the four categories of perceptible (correctly
perceived) a￿ordances, false a￿ordances, hidden a￿ordances and ‘correct rejection’ (i.e. no
4a￿ordance present, and none perceived). Each of the categories potentially has some e￿ect
on behaviour: carefully determining the a￿ordances available for users to perceive can be part
of a strategic use of design to in￿uence behaviour (e.g. Du￿y and Verges’ (2009) work with
di￿erent shapes of aperture on recycling bins), while deliberately false a￿ordances (e.g. ’dummy’
thermostats: Sandberg, 2003) can also be used to in￿uence behaviour. Hiding an a￿ordance
(perhaps from certain users), making it more di￿cult to access or doing away with it entirely
can also be seen as strategic ways of in￿uencing behaviour. Indeed, it is clear that￿whether or
not seen as being about ’behaviour change’￿many design approaches involve the planning and
strategic manipulation of the a￿ordances (including perceived a￿ordances) and constraints of a
system. That is, the actions or functions which are o￿ered or presented to users (or which they
perceive are available to them) and the constraints or limits on their behaviour provided by the
system. Constraints are covered in section 2.3.3.
The manner in which the a￿ordances of a system are presented to users, and which possible
actions are made more prominent￿including aspects such as the choice of defaults￿will have
an impact on the choices users make: in the environmental ￿eld, a common example is the
increasing adoption of ‘economy’ 30￿ or 40￿C wash cycles on domestic washing machines.
Gibson focused mainly on visual perception, but later work, such as Gaver’s (1991) discussion
of tactile a￿ordances (feeling how sharp a knife is allows us to perceive whether it has the a￿or-
dance of slicing a tomato) and Stanton and Edworthy’s (1998) research on auditory a￿ordances
in medical environments, demonstrates a broader range of senses in which perceived a￿ordances
can be considered. Assuming that a system is not designed intentionally to have false or hidden
a￿ordances to trick or exclude users, in choice terms, a user can only choose options which he
or she perceives have the a￿ordance of being chosen￿i.e. correctly perceived a￿ordances.
2.1.2 A￿ordances and choice architecture
With the publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) bestseller Nudge, the term choice architec-
ture has entered political discourse. Politicians (e.g. Osborne, 2008) can now recognise them-
selves￿or journalists can cast them￿as choice architects, alongside decision-makers in every
￿eld from estate agents to party planners, health authorities to shopping centre developers. Es-
sentially, everyone who is involved in organising how some set of options or choices is presented
to other people is necessarily in￿uencing decision-making behaviour, whether intentionally or
otherwise. Design theorists (e.g. Buchanan, 1985; Redstrom, 2006) have noted this previously,
of course, as have￿explicitly or otherwise￿a generation of interaction designers deciding which
features should be enabled by default, which should be hidden away on an ‘Advanced’ tab, and
so on.
There are clear parallels with the concept of (perceived) a￿ordances: choice architecture is
about deciding which choices to make available (or not) to the user. In the sense of Heinz von
Foerster’s ethical imperative ￿Always act in ways that increase choice￿ (Ray, 2005), the role of a
choice architect in ‘editing’ choices for users has the potential to be problematic; similar debates
have occurred in the persuasive technology community (e.g. Berdichevsky & Neuenschwander,
1999) and in design for sustainable behaviour (Pettersen & Boks, 2008).
It might be considered that hidden a￿ordances are those which, while they are possible,
have been edited out of the choices available to us by the ‘choice architect’ for some reason.
For example, Starbucks’ ‘short’ cappuccino, while theoretically available, is intentionally not
5Figure 1: Matrix separating the existence of a￿ordances from the information available about
them, leading to four categories. Based on Gaver (1991)
listed on the chain’s menus (Harford, 2006): the ability to buy a short cappuccino is a hidden
a￿ordance, while the abilities to buy the sizes actually on the menu are correctly perceived
a￿ordances (assuming the customer has the ￿nancial capability to do so: Gibson (1979, p.127)
makes it clear that an a￿ordance must ￿be measured relative to the animal￿).
2.1.3 Taking the easiest choice
Where making things easier or harder ‘works’ to in￿uence behaviour, it may often be because
people take the ‘easiest’ choice in situations, particularly where they don’t have time or the
skills or even su￿cient interest to consider the options available in more detail. This may be
satis￿cing (Simon, 1956; 1969), and exploiting an awareness of this in a design sense is not
necessarily about treating users as lazy, but recognising that people are busy, time-constrained,
and trying to solve problems in their immediate environment (Krug, 2006).
As a special case of a￿ordances and constraints, default settings can be important here,
because many people never change them. The case of organ donation defaults is quite well-
known￿countries where by default everyone is a potential donor, and ones needs to opt out
of the system rather than opting in to it, typically have massively higher rates of donation. If
products and services can be deliberately designed so the easiest choice, or the default, is the
‘best’ one (the safest, the healthiest, the most sustainable, the most socially bene￿cial), or the
‘less desirable’ choices are harder (more hassle to achieve, or even impossible), there is signi￿cant
potential to in￿uence behaviour. This could involve extra technology, or be as simple as a parent
putting fruit within a child’s reach and sweets out of reach. Defaults will be considered in more
6Figure 2: These (pretty shallow) steps in Dawlish, Devon, have been labelled as such￿e￿ectively
un-hiding a hidden a￿ordance ￿presumably because without this, some visitors wouldn’t notice,
and would hurt themselves or others. Painting a white line along the edge is a common way of
improving visibility of steps, but actual labelling is fairly unusual.
7detail in a future working paper.
2.2 Relating a￿ordances to other concepts in choice & decision-making
What is missing from the simple division into di￿erent kinds of a￿ordances is a weighting of some
kind for alternative choices, which would determine which of the whole set of correctly perceived
a￿ordances are actually acted upon by the user. The processes by which these weightings are
assessed by the user and acted upon￿and the extent to which the ‘cognition’ and ‘context’
blades in Simon’s scissors (Simon, 1990) act￿are, of course, what much decision research is
about. As Gigerenzer and Fiedler (2004) put it, ￿it is essential to analyse the adaptive match
between cognitive and ecological factors.￿
Choice architecture approached from the designer’s domain will probably emphasise the con-
textual aspects, while approaching it from a cognitive psychology angle will favour the cognitive
blade.
2.2.1 Simon’s behavioural model
Simon’s (1955) categorisation of elements required for a model of rational behaviour is pertinent
here. His ￿set of behaviour alternatives￿, assuming they are all possible for a user, corresponds to
the set of a￿ordances present. The ￿subset of behaviour alternatives that the organism ’considers’
or ’perceives￿’ corresponds to Gaver’s perceptible a￿ordances.
Simon’s other elements￿￿the possible future states of a￿airs, or outcomes of choice,￿ ￿a
‘pay-o￿’ function, representing the ‘value’ or ‘utility’ placed by the organism upon each of the
possible outcomes of choice￿, ￿information as to which outcomes will actually occur if a particular
alternative... is chosen￿ and ￿information as to the probability that a particular outcome will
ensue if a particular behaviour alternative is chosen￿ are all elements making up the weighting
of the choices.
In most system design situations, for either usability or safety reasons, designers probably
want users to have a high degree of certainty about the outcome and payo￿ of each choice, so the
weighting reduces somewhat in complexity. A product (other than a game) where the user had
to work out the probabilities of certain outcomes occurring in response to particular interactions
would be di￿cult and probably unpleasant to use, at least until the user had learned patterns
and satis￿cing heuristics to achieve what was desired (although Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of
￿ow (1991), where a user’s skills keep pace with the challenge, may lie behind the enjoyment
some users derive from manipulating complex and arcane interfaces).
Yet in many cases, users do not have full information or understanding of what the outcomes
or implications of their actions will be beyond the immediate or surface functionality￿and this
is a major contributor to resource wastage worldwide. For example, one report by a document
management company cited by Condon (2006) estimated that ftse 100 companies typically
waste ¿400 million per year on unwanted printing. That waste has an origin, and it is in
millions of individual decision-making errors as users do not fully understand the outcomes of
the actions they are taking. The true weighting of the choices users make is either hidden,
ignored or poorly understood.
8Table 2: Choice architecture subsets and related concepts
2.2.2 Feedforward
The concept of feedforward, in an interface design context (Djajadiningrat, Overbeeke, & Wensveen,
2002) helps clarify this linkage from the user’s point of view, and make it more prominent: much
like the ‘tooltip’ that invites a user to ￿Right-click to display spelling suggestions￿ when hover-
ing the cursor over a potentially misspelt word, feedforward e￿ectively presents the user with a
simulation, preview or at least a suggestion of what the outcomes of an action could be, to help
support decision-making.
When combined with feedback on the impacts of what the user has already done (see section
3.6), users should be able to help build up their own weightings for the choices in front of them.
2.2.3 Putting this together
Table 2 shows how some of the concepts that have been discussed here ￿t together. They can
be considered subsets of choice architecture which allow a deeper understanding of what the
term might mean for designers. It is easy to imagine design ‘interventions’ occurring in each
column, with the level of detail at which this can be done increasing towards the right: while full
feedforward and feedback (on the right-hand side) might be the ‘best’ form of choice architecture
for educating the user how to make intelligent decisions about product use, the bluntest form of
‘choice architecture’ would simply be to remove the a￿ordances (or choices) the designer doesn’t
want the user to have. It is this reduction in choice which a number of critics of the choice
architecture concept fear (e.g. Perks, 2008; Rizzo & Whitman, 2008): using choice architecture
purely to constrain users’ behaviour rather than enable or motivate.
2.2.4 Implications for designers
￿ A￿ordances are a fundamental concept in thinking about how behaviour is in￿uenced by
design
￿ Manipulating perceptions of what actions are possible, or not possible, can be a large
component of in￿uencing behaviour
9￿ Hiding or revealing a￿ordances, or deliberately creating false a￿ordances, are additional
techniques available to designers
￿ The term choice architecture as used in behavioural economics has some overlap with
the concept of a￿ordances: choice architecture is about deciding which choices to make
available (or not) to the user, and this process is something designers are necessarily
engaged in
￿ Choice architecture approached from the designer’s domain will probably emphasise the
contextual aspects, although the dominant cognitive psychology perspective (unsurpris-
ingly) favours investigating cognitive processes
￿ The concept of feedforward, combined with feedback on the impacts of what the user has
already done (see section 3.6), users should be able to help build up their own weightings
for the choices in front of them.
2.3 Poka-yoke, forcing functions and constraints
￿Then, being much troubled in mind, I said to my men, ‘My friends, it is not right
that one or two of us alone should know the prophecies that Circe has made me, I
will therefore tell you about them, so that whether we live or die we may do so with
our eyes open. First she said we were to keep clear of the Sirens, who sit and sing
most beautifully in a ￿eld of ￿owers; but she said I might hear them myself so long
as no one else did.
Therefore, take me and bind me to the crosspiece half way up the mast; bind me as
I stand upright, with a bond so fast that I cannot possibly break away, and lash the
rope’s ends to the mast itself. If I beg and pray you to set me free, then bind me
more tightly still.’￿
Homer, The Odyssey, c.800 BC, book XII
As is apparent from discussion of physical architecture and behaviour (Lockton, 2011), many
situations where design has been used to in￿uence behaviour involve the layout, positioning and
￿xing (in one way or another) of objects in space. Barriers are a major subset of this￿Hollnagel
(2004, p.69) uses the term to mean ￿something that stops the passage of something or someone,
usually in a physical sense￿. Hollnagel frames the use of barriers in the context of accident
prevention (barriers which aim to prevent an accident taking place in the ￿rst place) and barriers
for protection, lessening the consequences of the accident (perhaps reducing its impact to a small
area or fewer people), and outlines a range of ways of categorising barriers according to various
characteristics, moving gradually into metaphorical applications of the ‘barrier’ concept.
2.3.1 Poka-yoke
A key point about the ‘barrier’ perspective is that it e￿ectively treats accidents as ‘unwanted
behaviour’ which can be a￿ected beforehand (reduced or eliminated) through design. A similar
10view is seen (with errors rather than accidents) in the concept of poka-yoke (Japanese: ‘mistake-
proo￿ng’2), in manufacturing engineering￿defensive design techniques originally developed by
Shigeo Shingo in the context of the Toyota Production System, intended to ensure ‘zero defects’
in assembly processes (Shingo, 1986). What perhaps sounds like a harsh zero-tolerance approach
to worker error is nothing of the sort: the poka-yoke approach aims to design out possible errors
by making it easier for the ‘right’ behaviour to occur, and more di￿cult or impossible for
the ‘wrong’ behaviour: ￿Too often, we blame people for making mistakes. Especially in the
workplace, this attitude not only discourages workers and lowers morale, but it does not solve
the problem. Poka-yoke is a technique for avoiding simple human error at work.￿ (Nikkan Kogyo
Shimbun, Ltd. & Factory Magazine, 1989).
Shingo’s original 1961 example involved a factory manufacturing a device with two switches,
each of which needed a spring inserted underneath it, under contract to the parent company.
Workers picked the springs from an open box of hundreds of springs, and often forgot to insert one
of them￿causing ill-feeling and extra inspection expenses between the companies, and within
the factory as workers were admonished for their forgetfulness. Shingo’s observation was that
it would be possible to create a physical analogue of a checklist￿by simply introducing a small
dish, into which the worker would ￿rst place two springs, before inserting them into the switch:
￿If any spring remained on the dish after assembly, the worker realized that the spring had been
left out, and the assembly was then corrected￿ (Shingo, 1986, p. 43). Grout (2007) sees this sort
of poka-yoke as ‘putting knowledge in the world’ rather than requiring the number of springs to
be ‘knowledge in the head’, using Norman’s terminology (Norman, 1988/2002).
This low-cost, simple change eliminated the problem of missing springs, and over the next
decades Shingo and others inspired by his ideas developed a large range of interventions, some
using technology such as limit switches and sensors to ensure that operations took place in
the right order, or warn if they were going wrong, others using jigs and templates to ensure
correct orientation of parts, and so on. Shingo divided the interventions into ‘control’ poka-
yokes, designed to prevent errors occurring by making it impossible or di￿cult to proceed until
the error is corrected, and ‘warning’ poka-yokes such as lights, buzzers, information displays and
reminders of various kinds, alerting workers to the presence of an error, abnormal condition or
extra step which needed to be performed. Warning poka-yokes, in the form of di￿erent kinds of
feedback, will be discussed further in section 3.6.
Other poka-yoke methods such as the use of ‘go/no-go’ gauging, templates and jigs (Chase
& Stewart, 2007) may fall somewhere between ‘warning’ and ‘control’, alerting the worker but
not always (depending on context) preventing the operation continuing. While developed in the
context of manufacturing, the poka-yoke concept has been applied in other ￿elds, for example
2It is useful here to make a distinction between types of error: in human factors terminology, mistakes ￿involve
a mismatch between the prior intention and the intended consequences￿ (Reason, 1990, p.6), while slips and lapses
are errors where the user’s intention may be correct but the correct action does not occur (Norman, 1983). As
Reason (1990, p.9) puts it, ￿a series of planned actions may fail to achieve their desired outcome because the
actions did not go as planned [e.g. slips or lapses] or because the plan itself was inadequate [e.g. mistakes].￿
In driving a car, changing up a gear before trying to accelerate would be a slip if done inadvertently (￿nding
the wrong gear) but a mistake if the driver believed this was the correct way to use the gears. In view of these
de￿nitions, poka-yoke would probably be better translated as ‘slip-proo￿ng’ (Grout, 2007, p. 3), or certainly
‘error-proo￿ng’, to include a wider range of errors. Shingo’s original term was baka-yoke (‘foolproo￿ng’), but he
recounts that, ￿around 1963, when Arakawa Auto Body adopted a ‘foolproo￿ng’ device to prevent seat parts from
being spot-welded backwards, one of the company’s part-time employees burst into tears...￿Have I really been
such a fool?￿ she sobbed... When the department head told me this story, it was clear to me that ‘foolproo￿ng’
was a poorly chosen term.￿ (Shingo, 1986, p. 45)
11Grout (2007) has produced Mistake-Proo￿ng the Design of Healthcare Processes , an extensive
guide systematically applying principles of poka-yoke (and other methods) to patient safety￿a
￿eld in which design and human factors have much to o￿er in terms of in￿uencing behaviour
of both sta￿ and patients (Lane et al, 2006). It is not a major leap to consider ine￿cient or
non-optimal operation of a consumer product by a user as an ‘error’ (whether mistake, slip or
even simply laziness), and some poka-yoke-style techniques as an appropriate basis for designing
systems to alleviate the ‘error’.
2.3.2 Forcing functions
There is a clear parallel here between Shingo’s control poka-yokes and what Norman has called
forcing functions, ￿something that prevents the behaviour from continuing until the problem has
been corrected￿ (Lewis & Norman, 1986, p.420). Norman (1988/2002) identi￿ed three types of
forcing function￿interlocks, lockins and lockouts￿all of which essentially force a user to carry
out operations in a certain order.
Interlocks The interlock on a microwave oven door prevents the oven being run with the door
open. Interlocks in ATMs return the customer’s card (and make sure it is removed from the slot)
before dispensing cash, making it less likely that the user’s card is left behind (this is covered in
more detail in Lockton et al 2010a).
Norman discusses (1988/2002, p.134) one of the most famous examples, the seat-belt interlock
on car ignitions, which forced a driver to fasten his or her seat-belt before the car’s ignition would
work. Championed by Lee Iacocca, president of Ford in the early 1970’s, ‘Interlock’ was brie￿y
made mandatory on new cars in the United States, but it was deeply unpopular and provoked
drivers to defeat it, e.g. ￿many people kept their seat-belts buckled￿but without wearing them￿
(Iacocca, 1984, p.315). As a result, ￿[i]n response to public pressure, Congress took about twenty
minutes to outlaw Interlock. They replaced it with an eight-second buzzer that would remind
passengers to buckle up￿ (Iacocca, 1984, p.315). 3 Latour (1992, p.225) suggests that such a
buzzer, because it is ￿so high-pitched, so relentless, so repetitive that I cannot stand it￿, still
e￿ectively involves ￿forcing me... to obey the law￿.
Interlocks have been proposed for crime control, preventing illegal acts by the user, such as a
breathalyser ￿tted to a car’s ignition system so that only when the test is ‘passed’ can the car be
started. These have been ￿tted by manufacturers such as Volvo as standard, and also mandated
for drivers previously banned for drink-driving (Weinrath, 1987). There are also variants of the
idea which would also deal with overly tired or drugged drivers, e.g. the ‘Simple Simon’ memory
game using coloured lights, used on the MG/British Leyland ssv1 ‘safety car’ prototype in the
1970s: ￿Get the (randomly generated) sequence wrong three times in a row, and [the driver]
would have to wait an hour before being allowed to try again. While designed primarily as a
safety device, this feature also doubled as pretty e￿ective immobiliser￿ (Berridge, 2004).
Lockins and lockouts Related to interlocks are lockins (in a di￿erent sense to the economic
usage) and lockouts. A lockin is a forcing function which prevents (or delays) a user from
stopping an operation or action which is deemed important. In product terms, an example
might involve certain buttons or keys being temporarily disabled, perhaps where accidentally
3In Shingo’s terminology, this is replacing a control poka-yoke with a warning poka-yoke.
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for computers, which permit ￿les and settings to be saved before allowing the power to be cut,
and indeed such soft power switches are now the norm.
Lockins with strategic intentions include ‘nag’ screens on software which require the user to
wait a certain amount of time before clicking ‘OK’ (i.e. exiting the current ‘operation’) in the
hope that a promotional message will be read (or that the irritation will become su￿cient that
the user registers, or pays for, the product (Fogg, 2003, p.106). In some cases, this type of lockin
is used to increase (marginally) the likelihood that an end-user licence agreement will be read,
by requiring that the user at least scroll to the bottom before proceeding. Lockouts are perhaps
closest in concept to Hollnagel’s barriers: an example given by Norman is a gate on a staircase
to prevent people, in a panic (e.g. in the event of a ￿re), accidentally running downstairs past
the ground ￿oor and into a basement (Norman, 1988/2002).
2.3.3 Constraints
Norman considers forcing functions within a wider ￿eld of behaviour-shaping constraints, con-
sidered alongside a￿ordances (see section 2.1). Sometimes this is about ￿deliberately making
[certain] things di￿cult￿ (Norman, 1988/2002, p. 203) in order to constrain users’ behaviour
to what is desired; Krippendor￿ (2006, p.108) notes that this is simply because ￿[t]he range of
possible uses of artefacts is usually far larger than anticipated by its designers￿.
In an environmental sense, rationing of electricity, water, printer paper and so on might be
considered as a constraint, even if not ‘true’ rationing but simply establishing a resource as
‘￿nite’ from the user’s point of view, within a limited context, by using the system to set limits
or targets which can be exceeded, but only with extra work, costs, or commitment by the user.
Coin-operated electricity meters fall into this category, but do not a￿ord users the granular level
of control over switching o￿ individual devices that would be possible with a modern energy
monitoring system. As Darby (2006) puts it, the fact that ￿approximately 85% of electricity
consumers and 90% of gas consumers in Great Britain pay for their energy in arrears... is not
conducive to conservation, or to control of costs.￿ In Northern Ireland pre-pay keypad meters
o￿er a 2% discount on electricity￿the reverse of the situation in much of the UK￿and as such,
around 25% of households use them, using around 3% less electricity than households paying in
arrears (Owen & Ward 2006).
Lilley (2005) notes that Unilever’s introduction of detergent tablets was in part a strategic
tactic to attempt to ensure that users do not use more (or less) than the optimum amount of
powder for each wash: pseudo-rationing in the form of portion control. Alternatively, resource
sharing, as simulated by the ‘Watt Watchers’ system (Fischer et al, n.d.), places a constraint on
the total amount of power (or other resource) being drawn at any moment in a system, causing
users to co-operate with each other to moderate their consumption. In terms of simple physical
constraints, smaller sinks (or sinks which noticeably expand when they are ￿lled beyond the
￿inscribed￿ capacity￿such as the Cran￿eld University/Electrolux Smart Sink (Sherwin et al
1998)) set an upper limit on the amount of water that can be used. Smaller rubbish bins (e.g. in
a kitchen) make users more aware of the amount of waste they are generating, since the rubbish
will have to be ‘taken out’ more often, and hence may encourage sorting of waste for recycling
and better compaction of waste in the home.
Applying some of these a￿ordance- and constraint-based techniques to the interaction be-
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variety of speci￿c implementations, some of which already exist, and some of which are purely
speculative. It should be noted that a number of these implementations may, depending on
how they are presented to users, become seen as excessive constraints on user behaviour. For
example, light ￿ttings can be designed so that only approved low-energy components will ￿t, as
is the case with the Eaton MEM bc3 range of lightbulbs and lamp-holders (Eaton Corp. 2003;
Lockton 2007), created to meet UK Building Regulations requirements for lighting points in new
homes which will only accept low energy lamps (O￿ce of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2002, p.
17) by compelling users to buy special 3-pin bayonet compact ￿uorescent bulbs (functionally
identical to standard CFLs) and preventing the ￿tting of 2-pin bayonet bulbs entirely (whether
incandescent ￿lament or CFL). This creates an economic lock-in, not generally in the consumer’s
interest, and likely to provoke adverse reaction, as the readers’ comments appended to a blog
post on the subject, Lockton (2007), demonstrate.
Self-control and choice editing There is also the possibility of deliberately introducing con-
straints into the environment to shape one’s own behaviour￿perhaps ‘enforcing’ self-control￿using
what Ainslie (1982) has called extrapsychic devices, such as Odysseus’s asking to be bound to
the mast in the extract opening this section; Baron (1994, p.521) suggests that ￿[w]e can throw
away the bottle of scotch, or throw away the ice cream we are trying to avoid (so that when we
want it late at night, it will not be there, and it will be too late to buy any).￿
There are parallels with the idea of commitment devices, arrangements which people make
in order to make it more likely they will stick to a goal￿for example, promises to other people,
or even ￿nancial ‘commitment contracts’ as used by StickK.com (Ayres, 2010). While they
are usually discussed in a behavioural economics context, commitment devices can be physical
constraints, deliberately self-imposed￿Bryan et al (2010) mention ideas such as cutting up credit
cards, taking a ￿xed amount of cash out to a party, and leaving paperwork at the o￿ce rather
than bringing it home, while Ariely (2008, p.122) mentions the ‘ice-glass’ method for reducing
impulsive spending: ￿You put your credit card into a glass of water and put the glass in the
freezer. Then, when you impulsively decide to make a purchase, you must ￿rst wait for the ice to
thaw before extracting the card. By then, of course, your compulsion to purchase has subsided.￿
The ultimate behaviour-shaping constraint may simply be removing a function entirely￿what
might be termed feature deletion, or in policy terms, choice editing (e.g. Sustainable Consump-
tion Roundtable, 2006). The intervention by Dr John Snow, who ￿took the handle o￿ the Broad
Street pump in 1854, terminating that pocket of the Soho cholera epidemic by cutting o￿ the
supply of contaminated water￿ (Goldacre, 2008, p.105) is one of the most famous examples here.
In Ian Fleming’s Dr No (1958), a luxurious hotel-type room in which Bond ￿nds himself only
signals that it is a prison by the absence of door handles. Various politicians have also proposed
removing standby buttons from consumer electronic products (Sunday Times, 2006), with the
aim of reducing energy use. A legend often cited in discussions of game theory (e.g. Slee, 2006)
states that William the Conqueror burned the boats that brought him to England to demon-
strate his commitment and prevent his men ￿eeing, although as Kay (2005) ￿nds, along with a
similar story about HernÆn CortØs, historical evidence does not support this.
142.3.4 Implications for designers
￿ The poka-yoke, forcing function and barrier perspectives e￿ectively treat errors and acci-
dents as ‘unwanted behaviour’ which can be reduced or eliminated through design; it is
not a major leap to consider ine￿cient or non-optimal user behaviour as an ‘error’ and
design accordingly.
￿ Design can make it easier for the ‘right’ behaviour to occur, and more di￿cult or impossible
for the ‘wrong’ behaviour.
￿ Real, simulated, perceived or self-applied constraints can be seen alongside a￿ordances as
important components of design to in￿uence behaviour.
153 Information ￿ows as a leverage point
In section 1, Meadows’ (1999) classi￿cation of leverage points was introduced, and the idea of
working with information ￿ows was extracted as a potentially relevant approach for designers
seeking to in￿uence behaviour. These interventions involve changing what information about
a system is available, and to whom, at di￿erent times. One of the examples Meadows (1999)
gives in her original treatment of ‘the structure of information ￿ows’ directly relates to building
energy use:
￿There was this subdivision of identical houses, the story goes, except that for some
reason the electric meter in some of the houses was installed in the basement and in
others it was installed in the front hall, where the residents could see it constantly,
going round faster or slower as they used more or less electricity. With no other
change, with identical prices, electricity consumption was 30 percent lower in the
houses where the meter was in the front hall.
We systems-heads love that story because it’s an example of a high leverage point in
the information structure of the system... It’s a new loop, delivering information to a
place where it wasn’t going before and therefore causing people to behave di￿erently.￿
Most of the review here concentrates on the literature on information ￿ows and energy use,
but many of the same principles can be seen in information-based interventions for other social
bene￿t behaviour changes, such as encouraging exercise or healthier eating.
3.1 Antecedent and consequence information
It is the principle of ￿delivering information to a place it wasn’t going before￿ which is central to
many designed interventions, but there is a further useful distinction here: antecedent informa-
tion, which is delivered before any action has taken place, and consequence information, which
is delivered afterwards (Tuso & Geller, 1976).
Educational information campaigns are examples of antecedent information, and assume that
members of the public will change their attitudes, and hence their future behaviour, in response
to the information, whereas feedback, as described in the quote from Meadows, is very much
consequence information (though of course it is antecedent to the next time the person uses the
device). Reviews (e.g. Geller et al, 1982) have found that antecedent information is overall less
e￿ective than consequence information (feedback) at in￿uencing energy conservation behaviour,
but there are also antecedent techniques such as feedforward (see section 2.2.2) which do not
seem to have been investigated in as much detail.
3.1.1 Simple prompts
In some situations, very simple in-context antecedent prompts for particular appliances have
been tested, most notably with lighting: usually labels or signs placed above light switches in
communal areas in workplaces￿often in classrooms or shared o￿ce areas. Winett (1977) found
that signs asking students (or sta￿) to turn lights o￿ after 5 pm led to lights only being on 40% of
the time in rooms where they had previously been on 95% of the time, while signs merely asking
for lights to be switched o￿ to save energy had almost no e￿ect. The John Lewis Partnership
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behind the scenes in its stores and o￿ces (Independent, 1998) and a number of organisations
which aren’t able to o￿er bonuses in this way have taken to emphasising switching o￿ lights as
an opportunity to reduce carbon footprint.
3.1.2 Modelling
Modelling is a form of very speci￿c antecedent information where users are shown a ‘model’ of how
they could behave, with the necessary steps explained in a way which gives people the con￿dence
to apply them￿usually in the form of a video or TV programme which portrays a typical group
such as a family making changes to their lifestyle and seeing the resultant bene￿ts. As Geller et
al (1982) put it, ￿this does not mean just telling consumers, ‘Insulate your home’, but actually
showing them all the processes involved in accomplishing a particular conservation strategy.￿ The
main facilitator of this sort of approach from the 1980s onwards in the US was the accessibility
of cable TV and latterly VCRs, for the ￿rst time enabling programmes to be distributed to
users and their e￿ects measured; Winett et al (1985) found that ￿after one programme exposure
(about 20 minutes), viewers adopted simple strategies modelled in the programmes which led to
savings of approximately 10% on their home energy use for a substantial part of the cooling and
heating season.￿
Elements of the modelling approach are apparent in some current initiatives such as the
UK Government’s Act on CO2 calculator, which o￿ers (after an extensive series of questions) a
tailored plan for householders to cut their carbon footprint and (potentially) to save money.
3.2 Context-based approaches
Combining a￿ordance- and constraint-based approaches with changes to information ￿ows leads
to context-based approaches to in￿uencing sustainable behaviour, where a￿ordances, constraints
or persuasive elements are selectively enabled or displayed depending on users’ behaviour at
the time. This is a subset of the ￿eld of intelligent machines, pervasive computing, smart
objects, ambient informatics and so on: systems which automatically adapt their behaviour to
information and circumstances in their environment, with arti￿cial intelligence at the peak of
the ￿eld.
From the sustainable behaviour point of view, ‘closed-loop feedback’ systems which auto-
matically correct user ‘errors’, where ine￿cient behaviour is de￿ned as an error, are a step up
from simple ‘open-loop’ feedback. This approach could involve continuous active monitoring of
user behaviour, with ‘correction’ where necessary (analogous to electronic traction or stability
control for cars), or systems which merely compensate for resource-intensive errors directly (e.g.
a sink where the tap is switched o￿ when the water reaches a certain level, rather than being
allowed to run down the over￿ow).
If the error correction is su￿ciently reliable, users may no longer need to perform certain
interactions at all￿a washing machine which switches to half-load settings automatically by
weighing the load perhaps no longer needs a half-/full-load setting on the fascia. If it can read
information about the clothes (e.g. from RFID tags) or even detect the amount of soiling, all
the settings may be processed automatically, without user interaction.
At the extreme of the context-based approach would be the ‘optimum lifetime product’,
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lifetime optimisation strategy (Chalkley et al 2001) with a known amount of hours’ use, a known
amount of wear, and a known amount of energy used. This would ensure that products returned
under manufacturers’ take-back schemes are in predictable condition and replaced at the most
e￿cient point to do so; this approach may be most appropriate for a product -service system,
where the user e￿ectively rents the functions provided rather than owning the appliance outright.
Many o￿ce photocopiers and printers are currently provided under this kind of arrangement:
other appliances might be able to bene￿t from a similar scheme.
3.3 Di￿erences between information use in di￿erent contexts
One of the main di￿erences between interventions to in￿uence energy use in particular contexts,
e.g. when comparing residential and workplace contexts, is that where individuals are no longer
paying for energy themselves, some of the price-based techniques may not be e￿ective. The
e￿ect is also apparent (and more directly comparable) in so-called master-metered residential
developments (where utility bills are included in the rent). Lutzenhiser (1993) quotes Stern et
al (1986) who claim that in the US, master-metered apartment complexes use on average fully
35% more energy than individually metered sites. It is not known if this level of di￿erence still
holds in the US (or indeed in the UK).
Hackett & Lutzenhiser (1986) found that within master-metered complexes, there is signi￿-
cant variation in behaviour: ￿di￿erences as large as 300% between nearly identical households￿
which suggests that it is not universally true that people will waste energy if they don’t have
to pay for it. This may hold up empirically for workplaces too: someone in the o￿ce may
be fastidious about turning o￿ the lights, while someone else doesn’t bother. The interaction
between many di￿erent groups￿building owners, the companies renting a buildings, facilities
managers, individual sta￿, architects (at design time)￿results in the energy use for a workplace,
but more research is clearly needed to understand these interactions, how they contribute to
wasting energy, and how to in￿uence behaviours.
Walker (1979) put together a programme in which apartments in a master-metered complex
were randomly checked, and if residents were behaving in an energy-e￿cient manner (windows
closed if the heating or air conditioning were on, reasonable settings for thermostats), the res-
idents received $5 payment. These incentives cost the apartment managers $200 per month
in payments, but saved $320 in electricity￿reductions in electricity use of 2.2% in the heating
season and 8.6% in the cooling season were obtained. It is not unthinkable that a similar scheme
could be run in other contexts such as workplaces, or indeed a scheme where o￿ces compete with
each other to reduce their energy use, with the winners receiving some kind of bonus. Chandler
et al (1978; cited in Cone & Hayes 1984) ran this sort of competition between college dormitories
(who already had a degree of rivalry) and managed to obtain a 10% reduction in energy use.
Longer-term e￿ects may not be maintained, though, once the competition is over, which suggests
the establishment of an ongoing league or weekly / monthly award.
Cone & Hayes (1984) relate a relevant anecdote here, which touches on both energy literacy
and pro￿igacy:
￿In one of our studies on energy conservation... we attempted to reduce electricity
consumption in a married-student housing complex. These apartments were rented,
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All of the heaters in the apartments were undoubtedly going full blast. Strangely,
however, the sound of an air conditioner came from one of the apartments in the
complex. Upon further investigation, the reason became clear. One of the resi-
dents apparently did not like how warm his living room got from the stationary gas
heater. Rather than turning down the heater, he had adjusted the temperature by
simultaneously running the air conditioner!￿
As mentioned in section 3.1, the assumption that education and information lead to attitude
changes (antecedent strategies), which then lead to behaviour change, is widely regarded as
too simplistic to be true in all cases: e.g. Lutzenhiser (1993) argues that ￿rather than con-
servation attitudes necessarily preceding behaviour, behavioural changes can also result in new
energy attitudes￿attitudes, action, and rates all being elements of institutionalized energy use
arrangements.￿
In a simple example, someone who has lived in a rented property with a prepayment coin- or
keymeter and has e￿ectively been forced to behave carefully with electricity use, may develop a
pro-conservation attitude and habits which are retained later in life and in other areas such as the
workplace￿the behaviour preceded the attitude. In more complex examples, the phenomenon
of cognitive dissonance may come into play, when people adjust their attitudes to be consistent
with their behaviour (or the other way round). This seems a particularly pertinent consideration
for situations where people’s behaviour may be di￿erent in di￿erent contexts, perhaps due to
social e￿ects.
3.4 Information campaigns
Information campaigns￿social marketing￿are a major component of government strategy on
environmental behaviour change, but as Darby (2006) notes, ￿information on its own has a poor
track record in achieving energy conservation. While people may appreciate the message, few
are likely to be spurred into action.￿ Staats et al (1996) evaluated a 2-month public information
campaign in the Netherlands intended to raise public understanding of the greenhouse e￿ect
and ways of changing behaviour to address the problem, and found that while there was some
increase in knowledge, the e￿ect on (self-reported) behaviour was very slight, and mainly ￿limited
to a group that already showed more environmentally favourable behaviour before the campaign
started.￿
Heberlein (1975) carried out a ‘secret’ study of how information campaign a￿ected domestic
electricity consumption: he sent particular households informational pamphlets, some encour-
aging conservation, some encouraging consumption, and read their external meters himself for
12 days before and after receiving the pamphlets, without telling any of the householders they
were part of a trial. None of the households changed their electricity usage one way or the
other. Heberlein returned a year later, after the massive US government pro-conservation cam-
paigns arising from the 1973-4 oil crisis, and again secretly read the meters. Again, he found no
di￿erence in consumption from the original levels read the previous year.
However, in some cases, the e￿ects of campaigns have outperformed feedback and other mea-
sures after studies have ended: once the displays or feedback devices are removed, those building
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received information on energy saving and started to conserve energy during the study, without
having any feedback devices, may continue with their bene￿cial behaviour afterwards (Ester,
1985, cited in Lutzenhiser, 1993). In this sense, then, it seems as though information campaigns
may be best suited as longer-term interventions, aiming to increase users’ understanding of, and
interest in, environmentally or socially bene￿cial behaviour so that they care about it and are
more likely to respond favourably to feedback or other shorter-term interventions.
Wilson & Dowlatabadi (2003), reviewing work in this area applying social psychology and
behavioural economics approaches, concluded that ￿the most e￿ective information in promoting
residential energy e￿ciency￿ is ￿simple, salient or vividly presented, personally relevant and easily
comparable￿, rather than ￿technical, detailed, factual, and comprehensive￿ (Yates & Aronson,
1983); Abrahamse et al (2005) add that such information must also be speci￿c (i.e. presented in a
way which makes it applicable to speci￿c situations). It is also important (Farhar & Buhrmann,
1998) that the information provider￿which may be a government agency, local authority or a
service provider such as the electricity company￿is perceived to be trustworthy and credible in
terms of relevant expertise.
3.5 Source credibility
This combination of trustworthiness and expertise is often referred to as source credibility (e.g.
Fogg and Tseng, 1999), and it would seem apparent that where trust in the organisation doing
the ’persuading’ (e.g. a utility company) is low, perhaps because of perceived con￿ict between
their pro￿t motive and messages about conservation, messages delivered by other organisations
might be perceived as more credible.
Lutzenhiser (1993) cites ￿one marketing experiment in which solicitations for a programme
were made on three di￿erent letterheads: the utility company’s, a joint utility-county government
letterhead, and the county’s alone. The latter received a signi￿cantly better response￿ (Miller
& Ford, 1985), going on to suggest that ￿community-based, nonpro￿t contractors￿ might be the
most credible sources in the context of, for example, weatherproo￿ng advice.
It is easy to imagine that programmes very clearly run by local people in a community
(e.g. a series of electricity meter trials carried out in Talybont-on-Usk, Brecknockshire: Kidd
& Williams 2008) could have a similar e￿ect, particularly if tailored to individual households
rather than presented in a one-size-￿ts-all mass dissemination style. Geller et al (1982) note
that ￿a common reply... from state DOE [Department of Energy] personnel when asked about
residential energy conservation programmes was: ‘We have a great programme. We’ve sent out a
million informational brochures.’ It is quite clear now that a million brochures sent to consumers
does not equal a million kWh saved each day!￿
Gates (1976) studied energy utility companies’ advertising in the US, which switched from
promoting consumption to conservation as a result of the 1973 oil crisis, and found that overall
the advertising had little e￿ect one way or the other on electricity sales, with other factors such
as appliance stock and weather being far more signi￿cant. As Gates put it, ￿if [energy utility]
advertising has been unsuccessful in selling more electricity, is there any hope that it can be
successful in selling less electricity?￿
203.6 Feedback
Going on to consequence information strategies, feedback in many di￿erent forms is the core
of the majority of information ￿ow interventions. As Wilson & Dowlatabadi (2007) put it, ￿to
conserve energy, home occupants must know how behaviour and energy use interrelate and must
be motivated to conserve... information provides the former, incentives provide the latter, but
only feedback provides both.￿
Some researchers distinguish absolutely between direct feedback (e.g. a real-time display)
and indirect feedback (e.g. quarterly reports) as if they are mutually exclusive, but it is clear
that in practice these can often be employed in conjunction. It makes sense to think of the
‘oftenness’ (frequency) and ‘completeness’ of feedback as being variables, the e￿ects of which
can be tested. Fischer (2008) proposes that feedback methods can be assessed according to
frequency, duration, content, breakdown, medium of presentation, comparisons, and combination
with other instruments and this approach will be roughly followed here.
3.6.1 Frequency & duration
The question with frequency is how often feedback should be given￿from quarterly or annual
reports or bills right down to instantaneous, continuous real-time monitoring. Abrahamse et al
(2005), reviewing 38 studies on interventions to in￿uence household energy use, found that ￿re-
sults... seem to suggest that the more frequent the feedback is given, the more e￿ective it is￿, but
also noted Kantola et al’s work in Australia (1984) which showed that a single piece of feedback
evoking considerable cognitive dissonance can reduce energy use. In this study, users who were
￿informed of an inconsistency between their previously measured attitudes toward conservation
and actual high consumption of electricity￿ tended to reduce their electricity consumption, at
least in the immediate period after the dissonance was evoked. It is, however, hard to see how
this sort of e￿ect could be maintained in the longer term.
It does seem as though frequent, quick or instantaneous feedback is e￿ective (e.g. McCalley
& Midden, 2002; Hutton et al, 1986; van Houwelingen & van Raaij, 1989), often in conjunction
with some kind of goal, challenge or standard which participants are encouraged to aim for. The
standard type of household utility bill arriving every few months (and often estimated) is, as
Gaskell et al (1982) put it, ￿a form of feedback in which the feedback loop is too far removed from
the use of inputs to have any information value￿ (quoted in Darby 2006). Fischer (2008) suggests
that ￿quick feedback would improve the link between action and e￿ect, and therefore, increase
consciousness about the action’s consequences. Furthermore, persistent e￿ects would be more
likely if feedback is given over a longer time, because new habits can form during that time.￿ In
her review, she found that trials where the feedback was daily or more frequent (e.g. real-time)
all outperformed trials where the feedback came at intervals of a month or more. Traditionally,
however, real-time feedback has been expensive and di￿cult to implement, which has led many
researchers to concentrate on summary feedback either daily or weekly. Nevertheless, they have
often obtained quite signi￿cant results, again, particularly when a goal is set (e.g. Becker, 1978;
Winett et al, 1979).
213.6.2 Combining feedback with goal-setting and commitment
A number of successful studies have combined feedback (ideally frequent) with a goal, either
set by the experimenters or by participants themselves. Becker’s (1978) study suggests that
a di￿cult goal may be more e￿ective than one that is too easy, since it gives householders a
challenge which, even if they don’t achieve it, is ‘asymptotically’ within reach to use Pink’s
(2009) phrasing. Nevertheless, the goal must be realistically achievable: if people believe they
have no hope of reaching it, however hard they try, there is little incentive to try. The ‘sweet
spot’ will necessarily di￿er for di￿erent people in di￿erent circumstances, though it is unclear
how best to assess this.
Commitment and consistency will be discussed in a future paper, in the context of Cialdini’s
work, but it is worth considering them further here in the context of feedback. To some extent,
the experience of committing oneself to a goal (or being seen to do so) may be an important
part of achieving the goal in itself. Freedman & Fraser (1966) asked a sample of householders to
sign a ‘Keep California Beautiful’ petition, and then soon afterwards a di￿erent experimenter to
the one who had asked them about the petition made an (on the face on it) irrelevant request
to put up a (quite obtrusive) ‘drive carefully’ sign in their front gardens. 47% of these
householders agreed, compared with only 20% agreement from a control group who had not
been asked about the petition ￿rst￿suggesting that the commitment to being ‘public spirited’
in general engendered by signing the petition may have made people feel that they wanted to
act consistently with this in other areas of their lives.
Seaver & Patterson (1976) brought a social aspect to the commitment strategy, by sending a
decal (sticker) saying ‘We are saving oil’ to householders whose heating oil consumption was lower
than for the same period the previous year, and then monitoring how much those households
used after receiving the decal, compared with groups who did not receive it: they found a
10% reduction in oil use. Whether or not householders actually did anything with the decal,
it represented some ‘commitment’, ￿a social recognition of their e￿orts to save oil￿ (even if
not intentional). Where householders did put the decal up somewhere visible, perhaps where
neighbours could see it, there may be a social commitment e￿ect (see below): neighbours now
expect the family to be energy e￿cient people, even though they have no way of monitoring each
other’s oil usage. Cone & Hayes (1984) suggest that ￿the e￿ects might be stronger if the decal
was sent to all families regardless of consumption. You can easily imagine that just displaying
the decal would lead neighbours and others to ask what the families are doing to save oil. This,
in turn, might lead them to attempt to practise what they preach.￿
3.6.3 Ultra-simple feedback
Feedback need not be complex: one of the earliest intervention studies on energy use, Kohlenberg
et al (1976), simply involved a 40W light bulb positioned in householders’ kitchens which would
illuminate when the household was using high levels of electricity￿with the aim of encouraging
householders to shift consumption to o￿-peak periods. This proved e￿ective to some extent,
particularly when combined with ￿nancial incentives. (It is interesting to note that Kohlenberg
et al suggest that ￿Voltage reductions that would dim the lights, or an easily readable watt-hour
meter in the home are two of the many possibilities for providing feedback devices that might
in￿uence consumption.￿)
22Another 1970s study, Becker & Seligman (1978) used a simple ￿ashing blue light to signal to
building users that the outside air temperature was low enough (68 ￿F) that opening a window
would be better then keeping the air conditioner running. Only switching o￿ the air conditioner
would extinguish the light. Users with the blue light device used 15.7% less electricity during
the trial than those without it. Some modern smart meters and energy monitors incorporate a
‘load limit’ alarm which sounds when a predetermined level of energy use is reached.
Very simple feedback is also the principle behind the Interactive Institute’s Power Aware
Cord, an extension lead where the cable is illuminated when power is being drawn, in the
process intended to improve energy literacy (Gustafsson & Gyllensw￿rd, 2005, quote one tester
who exclaimed that ￿I think this is what power cords look like on the inside. You have just made
it transparent!￿)
3.6.4 Types of information / content / units
In the literature relating to feedback on energy use, there is unfortunately no consensus on the
units or types of information than feedback should provide to be most e￿ective. Many studies
have used both kWh (or equivalent) units and monetary costs. Environmental impact in term
of carbon footprint is a relatively new possibility here. Abrahamse et al (2005) note that ￿It
is not clear whether it makes a di￿erence to give feedback in terms of monetary rather than
environmental costs, since studies investigating this di￿erence did not ￿nd any (e.g. Brandon &
Lewis 1999; Bittle et al 1979￿1980).￿ Fischer (2008) suggests ￿tailoring the kind of information
given to the potential motives and norms of the target group,￿ which would accord with a
segmentation approach.
Energy literacy comes into play: Kidd & Williams (2008) in trials with the Efergy energy
meter found that ￿most households had no sense of what their current consumption rate might
be in numerical (kW) terms because they had never before seen it expressed as a live number.
The number initially displayed was fairly meaningless to them until they saw it jump up or down
for the ￿rst time,￿ while Anderson & White (2009) found a mixture of levels of understanding
from their focus groups￿a typical example:
￿Nobody understood either Watts or kilowatt-hours. Everyone understood money.
After an explanation from the facilitator, two participants said they understood
kilowatt-hours for the ￿rst time but most remained ba￿ed. Their knowledge of how
much power familiar household appliances consumed was poor. For example, they
guessed the power consumption of a kettle to be: 60W, 155W, 800W, 1kW (twice)
and 60kW.￿
Some groups suggested ¿/day or ¿/hour as their preferred units for use on a feedback display;
no-one liked the Wattson’s ¿/year measurement. Anderson & White express an interesting
point about units:4 ￿It is particularly unfortunate that the unit that expresses a rate, the Watt,
sounds like a unit of quantity while the unit of quantity, the kilowatt-hour, sounds like a rate. In
the discussion of the power ratings of di￿erent appliances several participants asked if we were
talking about ‘Watts per second’ and the kilowatt-hour was as often referred to as ‘kilowatts per
hour’ as it was [otherwise] correctly described.￿
4The author is currently working on a study to investigate this issue further, since it seems crucial yet under-
explored in the context of energy display design.
233.7 Disaggregation & feedforward
Costanzo et al (1986) argued that ￿the impoverished, undi￿erentiated information communicated
by the monthly bill makes accurate understanding of energy use [by building users] unlikely,￿
and the use of feedback disaggregated by appliance would help considerably here. Darby (2006)
notes that:
￿An instantaneous, easily accessible display may give the consumer adequate infor-
mation on di￿erent end-uses, by showing the surge in consumption when the kettle is
switched on, or the relative signi￿cance of a radio, vacuum-cleaner or toaster. Infor-
mation on how energy use is disaggregated among end-uses in an average home can
also be given on the bill, as a general guide. Accurate, frequent billing will give the
householder a much better sense of the heating load at di￿erent times of year than
can be gained from a direct debit statement... [although] there are no data on persis-
tence of e￿ect for this type of feedback. The argument for it rests on the educational
e￿ect in raising awareness of the relative demand from di￿erent appliances.￿
It might also be considered that disaggregated device data of the kind made possible by compa-
nies such as Sentec and ISE / Navetas￿which shows users how much energy is being used by
di￿erent devices￿could act as a signi￿cantly improved method of real-time feedback. There is
also the possibility that relatively generic data on the costs or energy use of di￿erent appliances
could be incorporated into a kind of ‘energy price label’ for appliances￿using the principle of
feedforward (Djajadiningrat et al 2002; see section 2.2.2)￿presenting the user with a simulation,
preview or suggestion of the outcomes of an action. This would not require actual disaggregation
of appliance data, simply that a credible database of product use characteristics be available.
Appropriate feedback could help users to develop more accurate mental models of how the
engineered systems around them actually work, particularly in energy terms￿for example, Swe-
den’s Interactive Institute has done work including a computer game, ‘The PowerHouse’ which
aims to teach teenagers more about energy-using behaviours in the home, and the impacts of us-
ing di￿erent appliances in di￿erent manners, through simulating a household, the appliances, and
characters which interact with them (B￿ng et al 2006). The Institute’s Static! Research project
also led to a number of other interesting energy-use feedback concepts, including an electric ra-
diator using thirty-￿ve 60W incandescent lightbulbs (to illustrate clearly to users the signi￿cant
heat by-product of incandescent ￿lament household lighting) (Gyllensward et al 2006), and an
‘Erratic Radio’ which intentionally receives the 50Hz signals from household electric appliances
in the area, and uses these to a￿ect the tuning of conventional radio stations, so that the sound
quality deteriorates as more appliances are switched on in the room (Ernevi et al 2005).
The above examples help reveal the physical science behind everyday energy use; it is also
appropriate to demonstrate to users the ￿nancial costs of their behaviour￿how much extra it
will cost to switch a device on, how much it is costing per minute, how much it has cost in
the past month, and so on￿and this is something which the new generation of energy monitors
are well-placed to permit. For example, Ambient Devices’ wirelessly networked ‘Energy Joule’
(Ambient Devices, n.d.) aims to persuade users to alter their ‘discretionary’ electricity use in
response to signals about the current electricity cost per unit (e.g. reducing use at times of peak
demand on the grid), in the process saving money.
243.8 implications for designers
￿ Information ￿ows involve changing what information about a system is available, and to
whom, at di￿erent times. The principle of ￿delivering information to a place it wasn’t
going before￿ (Meadows, 1999) is central to many designed interventions. Antecedent
information is delivered before any action has taken place, and consequence information is
delivered afterwards. Di￿erent design considerations are relevant in each case.
￿ There are a number of di￿erent kinds of feedback which it is possible to design, from the
ultra-simple to more complex ‘closed-loop’ systems which automatically correct ’errors’.
￿ The most e￿ective information campaigns (for home energy e￿ciency at least) present the
information in simple, vivid and personally relevant ways, with the source being perceived
as credible.
￿ More frequent feedback seems to be more e￿ective at in￿uencing users to save energy,
but a single piece of feedback evoking surprise (in turn, cognitive dissonance) can also be
e￿ective.
￿ Systems which either set a goal for users, or allow users to set their own goals, in conjunction
with feedback, can be e￿ective, and may involve commitments, social proof and other
mechanisms.
￿ The kinds of units or type of information used in feedback need to match the understanding
and literacy that users have in relation to the situation being monitored.
￿ Designing feedforward￿presenting the user with a simulation, preview or suggestion of
the outcomes of an action￿may require more data to be available, but o￿ers a new set of
possibilities hitherto underexplored.
4 Discussion
This paper has discussed, brie￿y, some aspects and implications of the use of a￿ordances (and
constraints) and information ￿ows as approaches to in￿uencing more sustainable user behaviour
through design, drawing on Donella Meadows’ framing of leverage points as the initial classi￿-
cation. As noted in section 1, the ‘design for sustainable behaviour’ use of these leverage points
is often in combination with each other: they are overlapping families of strategies.
Talking at the level of a￿ordances, constraints and information ￿ows is probably not su￿-
ciently ‘granular’ to capture the nuances of speci￿c design techniques in practice, but can be seen
as a possibly useful high-level classi￿cation for initial engagement with behaviour. For example,
we can ask questions such as:
￿ Are we trying to make it easier or harder for users to behave in a particular way?
￿ Can we make the ‘right’ behaviour the easiest one to do? (or the ‘wrong’ behaviour the
hardest?)
￿ Is there information which would help users make better decisions beforehand?
25￿ Is there information which we could give users afterwards which would help users make
better decisions next time?
￿ Is there information generated which currently does not go to where it would be useful?
All of these can help explore the problem better; the process of answering them will suggest
possible design solutions.
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